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If a country could leave the Euro, what would be the implications? Julian Le Grand argues
that some of the Euro-member states should quit and instantly re-join (QIR) the European
Economic and Monetary Union. Such an option would not only benefit deficit countries, such
as Greece, but also surplus countries, such as Germany.
With the possibility of a Greek exit from the Euro now being openly discussed, we now need
to start asking, if member states are to leave the Economic and Monetary Union, what is the
best way for the economic process to be managed to provide the soundest foundation for the
future growth and prosperity of the current membership?’
One answer is for member states to quit the European Monetary Union then instantly rejoin it either at
at a weaker rate for deficit countries, such as Greece, or a stronger rate in the case of countries in surplus,
such as Germany.
The problems facing the Eurozone have been ascribed to several different causes, including overspending by
the governments of peripheral members of the Eurozone, the debt problems faced by banks and households
throughout the zone, and the refusal of the European Central Bank to play a role as lender of last resort.
However, most analysts agree that the principal problem concerns the differences in the trends for
competitiveness of the members of the Eurozone.  Since the introduction of the euro, there has been a sharp
loss of competitiveness (as shown in Figure 1, which shows relative unit labour costs) for the weaker
members of the zone, such asGreece,Ireland,Italy,PortugalandSpain, and a dramatic gain in competitiveness
by, particularly,Germany.  In fact Germany and Austria are the only Eurozone countries to show any increase
in competitiveness over the period: Austria by 1% and Germany by a massive 20%.   This has contributed to
the  massive trade imbalances, and the consequent deficit financing problems, that have characterised the
current crisis.
Figure 1 – Trends in unit labour costs relative to EU17: selected countries 
This problem of imbalances in competitiveness between countries cannot be resolved by most of the
measures currently in place or about to be put in place. In particular, cutting government deficits, balanced
budget rules and support for the banking system do not directly correct the underlying trade imbalances.
However, the obvious alternative – for the weaker countries to withdraw from the Euro, to introduce a new
currency and to devalue – is also deeply unattractive. Quite apart from the political and economic implications
for the Eurozone as a whole of one or more countries leaving it, there are enormous economic and practical
difficulties that face any country introducing a new currency.
One way of overcoming at least some of these problems would be the following: At a given moment in time, a
deficit country withdraws from the Euro and denominates all its financial transactions in a temporary currency
at a given exchange rate. It then immediately rejoins the Euro but at a weaker exchange rate. I call this QIR,
for quit and instantly rejoin.
This form of QIR would be devaluation with the same beneficial consequences for improving a country’s
competitiveness, but without all the practical problems associated with introducing a new currency.
Especially in a world where many transactions are undertaken electronically, it would be relatively simple to
implement, with all prices and wages still denominated in Euros but marked down by the amount of the
devaluation. It would be socially and politically more acceptable than austerity measures such as direct wage
cuts, since it would leave households’ real incomes largely unaffected – except for those who spend large
sums on imports or who have large foreign debts. Since the exit would be temporary – indeed almost
instantaneous – it should help overcome the legal difficulty that no Eurozone country can officially leave it. The
principal losers would be those who spend a large portion of their income on imports or who have debts to
institutions outside the member state concerned; these are likely to be among the relatively well off, and
thereby perhaps better placed to take some of the pain than those bearing the burden of the austerity
measures already in place.
There are even more powerful arguments for applying the basic idea of QIR to surplus countries. In this case,
the country concerned would re-join at a stronger rate. The obvious candidate for a revaluation QIR of this
kind would beGermany. The country would benefit significantly, economically, socially and politically. German
households would have higher living standards, due to their increased purchasing power over imports and for
foreign travel.   Apart from a one-off price rise (matched by a parallel rise in money wages), the overall impact
would be deflationary, which should appeal to German monetary sensibilities. And Germany would not have to
pay to bail out the rest of the Eurozone.
The principal risks associated with either the devaluation or revaluation forms of QIR are the same as those
associated with any devaluation/revaluation. They include the danger of destabilising capital movements and
the associated difficulties for the banks, and that of debts (including sovereign debt) owed to institutions
outside the relevant Member State. The risk of capital flight from deficit countries is obviously real, although it
is probable that most of the mobile capital has already left the countries concerned. However, it is a problem
associated with any devaluation involving a convertible currency; yet it has not stopped such devaluations in
the past, nor limited their long-term effectiveness in restoring competitiveness. Moreover, it can be at least
partly addressed by temporary capital controls. Given the long-term improvement in the trade and general
economic prospects of the Eurozone following QIR, the foreign debt problem will be temporary, but, if acute,
may be resolved by restructuring short-term debt into long-term debt.
The QIR options for surplus or deficit countries will not resolve all the difficulties facing the Eurozone. To
prevent the resurgence of competitiveness problems, QIR would need to be complemented by structural
reforms within Eurozone members, especially for the labour market within deficit countries. Government
deficits would still need to be curbed in the long-term – though, with the economic stimulus provided by QIR,
this should prove much easier than now. Nor is QIR devoid of practical and political difficulties of
implementation. But then so have all of the alternative measures that have been proposed which aim to tackle
the crisis; and a respectable case can be made is that QIR in many ways is the ‘least worst’ option.
Moreover, it does have one cardinal merit, one that many, even most, of these alternatives lack: it addresses
the central problem of competitiveness.
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